Introduction
Historically, most American rocket propulsion systems have been comprised of one or more discrete engines, each with its own set of pumps, turbines, valves, and a thrust chamber. The engines in such a configuration are not tightly interconnected but work separately. Recently, a different propulsion concept has been suggested wherein the system is composed of a common set of turbopumps, valves and thrust chambers, all interconnected by manifolds. This configuration is referred to as an Integrated Modular Engine (IME). The I/viE concept offers potential advantages in reliability, cost and weight.
Each of these advantages must be verified carefully before resources are committed to developing such a system.
The potential reliability advantage of the IME stems primarily from its fault tolerant capability. In the traditional cluster of discrete engines, when a major component of an engine fails, the entire engine must be shut down, including those components which have not failed. In an IME system, it may be possible to shut-off a failed component withoutrequiringtheshutdownof other systemcomponents.To beconsidered truly fault tolerant,theIME systemshouldbecapableof maintainingfull thrustdespitea component failure. This would requirethatoperationof the other components in thesystembe adjustable to compensate for thelossof thefailed component. The feasibilityof fault tolerantoperationhasnot previouslybeenexploredin detail. Although propulsionsystemsin which multiple thrust chambers operatefrom commonturbopumpshave beenflown before(theAtlas booststageanda numberof Russianvehicles),thesesystems use integratedsystemdesignsfor reasons otherthanfault tolerance.Thefault toleranceof suchintegrated designshasneverbeendemonstrated. The purpose of themodelingeffort discussed in this paperis to providequantitativeinformationabouttheoperation of anIME systemwhenvariouscomponents arelost. A statisticalanalysisof IME reliability is presented in a separate paper._ A steady-state systemmodelof anIME hasbeen createdusingtheRocketEngineTransientSimulator (ROCETS)program.ROCETSis a general purpose systemmodelingcodecapableof bothsteady-state andtransientsimulation._The IME configuration modeledhereis acryogenichydrogen/oxygen expander cyclemadeup of four fuel turbopumps, four oxygenturbopumps, andeightregeneratively cooledthrustchambers (Figure1). The systemis designedto providea nominalthrustof 80,000Ibf (35586N). The basicconfigurationof thesystemis similar to thoseproposedin previousstudies3to providea basisfor comparison.The thrustlevel was selected to meetanticipated upperstageapplication requirements. Thenumberof combustionchambers (eight)wasselected to provideadequate thrust balance in theeventof component failure.The numberof turbopumpsets(four) wasselected to take advantage of theexisitingcomponent designs generated in theAdvancedExpander TestBed (AETB) program.4Component redesignand analysiswereperformed,whennecessary, atNASA Lewis usingsteady-state component computer codes. 5, 6 Using this modelof theIME, theeffectsof component failureon systemoperationare calculated.The failuresconsidered includelossof fuel and/oroxidizer turbopumps,lossof thrust chambers, andleaksin the variousdistribution manifolds. The computermodelis usedto predict thechanges in systemoperationthatarerequiredto maintaindesiredthrustdespitecomponent failure. Theresultantchanges in pumpstaU-margins and throttlingcapacityobserved in themodelwill help assess thefault-toleranceof this IME system.The resultsof this studyalsoprovideimportant 2 informationfor furthercomponent design iterationsto improvesystemfault-tolerance. Descriptions of thecomponentandsystem modelsarepresented below, followedby a discussionof the analysisresults.
Description of IME Model
The IME system design depicted in Figure 1 is based on a study being conducted at NASA Lewis Research Center to determine methods for physically assembling an IMEy This degign is a full-expander cycle, which means that the total hydrogen fuel flow passes through the nozzle and chamber cooling jackets.
The warmed hydrogen is used to drive the turbopumps, and is then injected into the combustion chamber. The IME design in Figure 1 implements full-expander operation as follows. Liquid hydrogen from the tanks is supplied to the four fuel pumps in parallel.
The fuel pumps discharge into a manifold (FPDM), which feeds the eight parallel cooling jackets.
The cooling jacket flows are collected in the next manifold (HXDM) and distributed to the four parallel fuel turbines, which drive the fuel pumps.
The fuel turbine discharge flows are then collected in a third manifold (FrDM) and distributed to the four parallel oxidizer turbines, which drive the LOX pumps.
Finally, the fuel is collected once more (in the OTDM) and distributed to the eight thrust chambers.
The oxidizer follows a much less circuitous route, flowing from the tank(s) through the four parallel LOX pumps and into the OPDM.
The oxidizer is then distributed to the eight thrust chambers. Each turbopump and thrust chamber assembly in the system has associated inlet and exit shut-off valves, which isolate that component from the rest of the system in the event of a failure. In addition to the shut-off valves, there are two system control valves. The main turbine bypass valve (MTBV) is used to control system thrust level. The fuel turbine bypass valve (FTBV) is used to maintain LOX pump discharge pressures at low thrust levels. In its present configuration, the system is not designed to control thrusts in the eight chambers independently. This ch'fferential throttling capability could be accomplished, if desired, by replacing the fuel and oxidizer injector shut-off valves with control valves instead.
This would, however, increase the complexity of the controller logic and the valve actuator system. Each fuel turbopump ( Figure 2 ) has three pump stages and two turbine stages. The first-stage fuel"turbinedrivesthe first-stagefuel pump(shaft1), while thesecond-stage turbinedrivesthesecondand third stagepumps(shaft2). Eachoxidizer turbopump(Figure3) consistsof a singleturbine driving a singleLOX pump. The nozzlecooling circuit is madeup of tubularchannelsWhilethe chamberemploysmilled channelsclosedoff by a metalskin. TheLOX injectorusesa dual orifice designsimilar to thatusedin the AETB.4
All valvesandductsin thesystem, with the exceptionof the fuel shut-offvalvesandfuel injectors,aremodeledwith non-inertial incompressible flow correlations.The distribution manifoldsarerepresented assimplenon-resistive volumes. Pumpperformances arerepresented as tables, or maps , of head coefficient and efficiency versus flow coefficient:
Turbine pei'formances are represented as bivariate maps of flow parameter (related to resistance) versus pressure ratio and reduced speedg, and by maps of efficiency versus velocity ratio:
The maps for the first stage fuel pump and the LOX pump are the same as those used for the AETB system, while the second and third stage fuel pump maps and all turbine maps have been redesigned.5.6
The design changes were necessary because the IME is a full-expander cycle while the AETB is a split-expander (where a large fraction of the fuel flow from the first stage pump is bypassed around the cooling jackets and turbines).
Chamber and nozzle performances are based on empirical tables and equations relating chamber pressure, propellant flow, mixture ratio, and thrust. Cooling jacket performance is calculated using Bartz correlations for the hot-side heat transfer 9 and using Colburn correlations for the cool-side transfer:0 Although the sizes and shapes of the IME chambers and nozzles have been changed from those in the AETB, that model's nozzle performance and heattransfer correlations can still be applied.
The model is solved under the ROCETS system using an iterative Newton-Raphson matrix solver:
Results of Analysi_
In this study, the effects of various component failures on system performance are examined. Ten scenarios were considered in all:
Test Case 1: Nominal case -all components operating normally Test Case 2: Single fuel turbopump out (when a fuel pump fails, the associated turbine is also shut down, and vice versa).
Test Case 3: Single oxidizer turbopump out (when a LOX pump fails, the associated turbine is also shut down, and vice versa). Each of the above scenarios was investigated at High and Low thrust levels.
The High thrust level of 80000 lbf (10000 lbf per chamber) was selected to provide approximately 9% turbine bypass while operating as close as possible to the turbomachinery design conditions. The Low thrust level of 29600 lbf (3700 lbf per chamber) was determined as the nominal minimum thrust before the potential onset of stall in the second stage fuel pump (the first to stall). The stall point is defined here by the zero slope point on head vs. flow map for each pump.
In this study, the turbine bypass valves are varied to maintain desired _ thrust in spite of the component failures (closed-loop control ). Failed components are isolated from the rest of the system using shut-off valves, located upstream and downstream of each component.
For each of the above listed failure cases, two indicators of system response are considered. The first indicator is the amount of bypass flow around each turbine cluster required to maintain the High thrust level. Decreased turbine bypass margins limit the ability of the system to provide higher-than-rated thrust excursions for emergency throttling and mission aborts. The secondindicatorof systemresponse is the pumpstall margin,definedhereas
where + is the pump flow coefficient 8 for each scenario at the Low thrust level, and +_ is the flow coefficient at which stall may occur in each pump. When the + is below +_t_, the operation of the pump may become unstable.
Tables la and Ib summarize key system performance parameters for the Nominal test case at High and Low thrusts respectively. Table 2 shows the changes from nominal in several parameters for the system's closed-loop response to the failure cases described above. These changes are expressed as percentages of the nominal values. Figure 4 shows the main turbine bypass and fuel turbine bypass flows for each scenario at High thrust, depicted in a histogram format. Turbine bypass margin is not a limiting factor at Low thrust for these failure cases. Figure 5 shows the second-stage fuel pump stall margins at Low thrust for each scenario.
The second stage fuel pump is highlighted here because it stalls first in each case, and will therefore be the limiting factor. Pump stall is not a problem at High thrust for these failure cases.
Figures 6a, b, and c show the system operating points, plotted on the performance maps for the first stage fuel pump, the combined second and third stage fuel pumps, and the LOX pump respectively. The operating points for both High and Low thrust levels are shown, numbered according to test case. These figures graphically depict the changes in pump operation from nominal (Case 1) for the various failure scenarios.
Discussion of Results
The first observation made during this study was that an FTBV is required as well as the MTBV, even for a healthy system, in order to maintain desired LOX injector pressure drops at lower thrusts.
Adequate injector delta-P is necessary to ensure that thrust chamber pressure oscillations do not propagate back into the system.
The injector delta-P also helps atomize the LOX for better mixing of propellants in the thrust chamber.
In the nominal High thrust condition for the system, the FTBV is closed, but must be opened in order to throttle the system to points below 68000 lbf thrust. Both MTBV and FTBV are required to accommodate component failures at all thrust levels.
Even so, the combination of MTBV and FTBV used here is not always adequate to accommodate component failures, as is discussed below.
Consider the effects of component failures on system performance at the High thrust level (80000 lbf total system thrust).
As shown in Figure 4 , the failure of a single LOX turbopump will prevent the system from operating at full thrust, despite attempts to compensate u_ing the turbine bypass control valves.
With one LOX turbopump shut-off, the maximum system thrust will decrease to 62000 lbf. Note also that while the system cannot maintain 100% thrust with a single LOX turbopump out, it can accommodate the loss of a LOX turbopump in combination with the shut-down of a fuel turbopump. It may be advantageous, therefore, to pair the fuel and LOX turbopumps and remove the intervening FTDM ring manifold.
This would, however, require separate fuel turbine bypass valves for each turbopump pair. Removing both turbopumps in this case also drives the remaining LOX turbopumps to dangerously high shaft speeds, as illustrated in Figure 6c (Case 4). Rotor-dynamic stability limitations may preclude the option of shutting down a turbopump pair and maintaining full-thrust in this configuration. An alternative solution to accommodate this type of fault is to redesign the system control strategy, using independent fuel turbine and LOX turbine bypass valves (instead of the MTBV and FTBV). Additional simulations have shown that independent turbine bypasses allow the system to maintain full thrust in the event of a LOX turbopump failure, without shutting down other components.
The shut-down of two thrust chambers is another case where the desired High thrust cannot be maintained by altering turbine bypass flows. Furthermore, when two thrust chambers are shutoff, it is not possible to attain even 75% of the desired system thrust (maintaining healthy chambers at their nominal high thrusts). In fact, the system cannot maintain the desired LOX injector delta-P for thrusts above 42000 lbf, and the pumps will be in danger of stalling for thrusts only slightly lower than 42000 lbf. Thus there is only a narrow range of thrusts around 53% where the system will maintain stable operation. The loss of two thrust chambers can be accommodated (at 75% system thrust) if a fuel and a LOX turbopump are also shut-off, but this negates the fault tolerance of the IME.
Figure4 indicatesthatrelativelysmallleaksin the distributionmanifolds(5% of theinlet flow) canbe accommodated atHigh thrustlevels. Leaksin the FPDM or HXDM do, however, causesignificant decreases in the turbinebypassmargin. Furthermore, it hasbeenfoundthata I0 % flow leak in eitherof thesetwo manifoldscannotbe accommodated atHigh thrust. In additionto performance degradation, leaksin themanifoldswill produceserioussafetyconcems.The manifoldsin theIME configurationarenot redundant and thereforerepresent a potentialsingle-point failure modefor the system._ As mentionedpreviously,the potentialonsetof pumpstallhasbeenusedto definetheLow thrust level (29600lbf total systemthrust). This study thereforeassumes a nominalstall marginof only about1% to beginwith. As seenin Figure5, most of thecomponent failurecasesactuallydrivethe fuel pumps_ from stall. This is truebecause these failuresincreasetheflow ratesthroughthe operating fuel pumpswithouta proportionate risein required dischargepressures. The failure of a singleLOX turbopumpor a leakin theOPDMwill causea small decrease in thefuel pumpstall margin,sincethese failuresincreasetheload onthe fuel pumpswithout increasingthe fuel pumpflows. By far themost severeproblemwith stallcomesfrom the shut-down of two thrustchambers, which decreases the flows in all pumpswhile requiringthemto keepthesame dischargepressures. This conditiondrivesall pumps into thestall regionatLow thrust. For thrust chamberfailure,the nominalstall margincanbe maintainedattheLow thrustlevelif a pairof fuel and LOX turbopumpsareshut-off aswell.
Theseresultssuggest that anIME propulsionsystem basedona full-expander cyclemayhavelimited faulttolerantcapabilities.It maynot be possibleto accommodate thelossof a turbopumpor thrust chamber by alteringtheoperationof theremaining components. This studyhasindicatedthatthe magnitudeof changerequiredto accommodate component failuresmaywell bebeyondthe capacity of the remainingcomponents,or may leadto stall or rotor-dynamicinstabilities.Although systemdesigns basedon anexpander cyclearesimpleandinvolve temperatures andpressures which placelessstrainon components, a morepowerfulcycle,usinggas generators for example, maybe morefault tolerant. It mayalsobepossibleto improvethesystemfault toleranceby using alargernumberof redundant components; thelossof a givencomponent will place lessof a loadon thesurvivingcomponents (seealso Ref.1). Alternativeconfigurationssuchasthese shouldbeexaminedusingsystemmodelsaswell.
Summary _nd Concluding

Remarks
A computer model has been created using the ROCETS code in order to study the steady-state performance of an IME rocket propulsion system.
The IME configuration chosen for this study is a full-expander cycle comprised of eight thrust chambers, four fuel turbopumps and four LOX turbopumps.
Using the model, the effects of several failure scenarios on system performance have been examined. Given the present designs of the turbomachinery and other components, several limitations have been noted regarding the IME system fault tolerance. In the IME system modeled here, failure of a LOX turbopump or thrust chamber cannot be accommodated at full-thrust. The impacts of these failures on system performance can be mitigated by shutting down other, unfailed system components.
Removing healthy components to accommodate failures, however, negates the potential advantages in fault-tolerance for the IME over discrete engines.
The model indicates that this IME system can accommodate small leaks (5% of flow) in the distribution manifolds.
With the exception of a thrust chamber failure, the scenarios simulated here do not appear to significantly increase the threat of stall at low thrust levels; in most cases, the failures actually reduce the likelihood of stall. No attempt has been made here to assess the threat of pump cavitation.
This simulation study has provided some important information regarding the failure response of one IME configuration.
Although this study has indicated that the IME may not be as fault-tolerant as previously believed, it would be premature to suggest that the IME concept is unworkable based on these results alone. It may yet be possible to redesign the components or system to improve fault tolerance; these simulation results can, in fact, be used to guide such design efforts.
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